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Enterprise Social Benefits and the 
Economic Transition in Hungary 
Martin Rein* 
Barry L. Friedman** 
In Hungary as in other East Bloc countries, enterprises have given a variety of non- 
wage benefits to their workers, sometimes called the "social wage." We explore what has 
happened to non-wage compensation during the economic transition which began in 1989. 
During this period, the real wage has fallen, and many aspects of enterprise operations have 
undergone change. This paper considers three broad questions. (1) How has total 
compensation and its composition changed during this period of restructuring? Have changes 
in non-wage compensation offset or reinforced changes in wages and which elements have 
been increasing, which decreasing? (2) What factors can account for the change? (3) Have 
enterprise non-wage benefits in fact served social functions in addition to their business 
functions, and, if so, has the social role of benefits changed during this period? This paper 
offers an exploratory investigation of these questions. 
We have assembled several sources of data on non-wage compensation in Hungary. 
The data are generally aggregative. We supplemented these with six case studies of 
individual enterprises.' These data are not sufficient for a rigorous investigation of our 
questions, but they help suggest aspects of these issues. Moreover, they help identify 
complications relevant to a full analysis and the data that would be required to deal with them. 
The paper is basically an initial exploration of the available data and of a framework that 
could help analyze it. 
We first suggest a framework for thinking about the determinants of non-wage 
compensation and its possible social functions. Then, we use our framework to explore our 
questions using the various data sources. Finally, we consider the requirements for a more 
complete analysis. 
I. Framework for Analysis 
A. The Determinants of Non-Wage Compensation 
The primary actors whose behavior determine non-wage compensation are employers, 
workers, and government. A current textbook approach to benefits and wages comes from 
hedonic wage theory which provides an equilibrium analysis of the behavior of employers and 
 worker^.^ This model can help with our question concerning the determinants of benefits, 
although it also has some limitations in the context of economic transition in Hungary. It is 
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particularly useful in explaining benefits intended to attract and retain workers. It can deal 
with the transition issue on a comparative static basis, predicting the changes in equilibrium 
wages and benefits resulting from changing exogenous factors. However, the transition has 
also affected benefits in a way not predicted by the model. One aspect of the disequilibrium 
in Hungary has been the shedding workers. In fact, benefits have been used extensively to 
facilitate this process. We will consider first the hedonic wage model, highlighting the 
insights it offers, and then turning to other factors which can supplement it in explaining the 
determinants of benefits during the period of transition. 
To sketch briefly the hedonic wage model, employers have a trade-off between wages 
and benefits which will keep profits constant at a competitive level (along an iso-profit curve). 
For workers there is also a trade-off reflecting relative preferences for wages and benefits and 
represented by indifference curves. Each employer would like to choose a particular wage- 
benefit combination which is expected to appeal to (maximize the utility of) the kinds of 
workers that the employer would like to attract. For the market as a whole, the employer iso- 
profit curves can be aggregated into an offer curve showing all available combinations of 
wages and benefits. Each worker pursues a point on the offer curve that will maximize utility 
by seeking a job from an employer offering a wage-benefit combination at or near the 
preferred point. Employers and workers may have to adjust their offers until the market 
clears. Government is not an explicit actor in this model, but its actions may affect both the 
iso-profit curves of employers and the trade-offs available to workers. For example, a tax or 
subsidy can change the terms of the trade-off between wages and benefits to the employer. A 
mandate can restrict employers to a particular wage-benefit combination, limiting their ability 
to attract the kinds of workers they want. 
This simple model helps identify a number of factors that might lead to changes in 
non-wage compensation. Any factor that affects enterprise iso-profit curves or worker 
indifference curves could affect it. On the enterprise side, cost factors, demand variables, and 
aspects of government regulation could affect the shape and position of the iso-profit curve. 
Consider first the cost factors that could change the cost of benefits relative to wages. 
Certainly government can influence the cost of benefits. For example, tax subsidies could 
reduce the net cost of particular benefits. Or, changes in regulations could permit enterprises 
to provide the same kind of benefit, but in a cheaper way. The government has been 
permitting a shift from in-kind to more cash-like forms of delivery for some types of benefits, 
perhaps reducing their cost to enterprises. In particular, enterprises have been trying to give 
up the infrastructure used to support some of the old forms of benefits, perhaps also reducing 
the cost of delivery. 
The demand side of an enterprise's market may also affect the iso-profit curve. The 
model assumes that profits are at the competitive equilibrium level. A change in demand for 
the output of the enterprise could displace profits from this level, requiring new adjustments 
to restore equilibrium. The enterprise could shed workers or cut non-labor costs. But it may 
also decide to cut compensation per worker, some combination of wages and benefits. If it 
does, the result would be a shift in the iso-profit curve. Thus, shedding workers is an 
alternative (or supplement) to shifting the iso-profit curve for an enterprise out of equilibrium. 
It is often asserted that enterprises in the socialist economy had soft budget 
constraints. If budget constraints have been tightened during the transition period, this could 
have an effect which is in part similar to a fall in demand, causing firms to cut costs, one 
option being a shift in the iso-profit curve. However, the existence of soft budget constraints 
adds a possible complication. The iso-profit curve might not be well-defined in the presence 
of a soft budget constraint. An enterprise might be able to move off its iso-profit curve if it 
could somehow be subsidized. Some enterprises may have been able to avoid the negative 
trade-off between wages and non-wage benefits altogether through subsidies. Assuming that 
wages could be monitored more closely than benefits, this might have resulted in more 
generous benefit packages from the enterprises successful in arranging subsidies. However, if 
budget constraints have tightened during the period of transition, the iso-profit curves should 
have become more clearly negative, controlling for factors such as the quality of the workers 
and the demands of the job. For the U.S., the few statistical studies have supported the idea of 
a negative relationship between wages and benefits.' 
One important feature of the model is that it allows enterprises to choose different 
packages of wages and benefits based on what they consider useful in attracting and keeping 
the kinds of workers they want. Government policy may have contributed to an increase in 
the variability across enterprises. In particular, the removal of government mandates could 
produce such a change. To simplify the issue, suppose that in the socialist system, the 
government mandated all benefits. In this pre-reform setting, we would expect a high degree 
of uniformity in benefit packages across enterprises. Suppose then that the reform 
government rescinded its mandate. Left on their own, some enterprises would drop the 
benefits (or some of them) while others might find them valuable in attracting or keeping 
suitable workers. In other words, we would expect increasing variability across enterprises in 
benefit packages during the period of reform. 
In fact, government policy in Hungary has been more complicated. While old rules 
and expectations have dwindled, the government has actually introduced some new mandates 
during the reform period. But increased variability still is a possibility. First, in some benefit 
areas there may, indeed, be less regulation. Second, the government may not enforce its 
mandates or do so only selectively. Third, some new government initiatives are in the same 
areas as old benefits, but allow enterprises more flexibility on how the benefits are delivered. 
As already indicated, some of the new regulations still try to encourage particular benefits, but 
allow enterprises more flexibility in the way they are delivered. Although variability may be 
expected in any case, the changing government policies could increase it across enterprises, 
either in kinds of benefits or, for a given kind, in the form of delivery. 
On the worker side, changes in consumer needs or tastes could change indifference 
curves. Any of these factors could change the equilibrium in ways that would induce 
employers to redesign their benefit packages. 
Considering limitations of the model, it was not designed to explain a situation of 
disequilibrium. However, as suggested above, aspects of the disequilibrium such as the 
shedding of workers can be related to the model. The feature not accounted for is the use of 
benefits to facilitate the shedding. However, government policy plays an important role in 
these benefits since i t  has in effect raised the price of shedding by requiring certain benefits. 
While it may be possible to incorporate this phenomenon into the model, we will deal with it 
separately in our discussion of the social functions of benefits. 
As one further limitation, the hedonic wage model treats government actions as 
exogenous and then predicts the reactions of enterprises and workers. In fact, however, 
government policy is also reactive. Government not only has its intentions which may change 
for exogenous reasons, but it also reacts to the behavior of enterprises, at least when it 
discovers what this behavior is. Over the long run, this may result in cycles of action and 
reaction in policy. This paper, however, is concerned primarily with the transition in Hungary 
since 1989. This period has probably been too short for complicated cycles. 
Our aggregate and case data sources do not permit a statistical test of the contributions 
of specific factors to the change in non-wage compensation. Rather, the discussion suggests 
issues to consider in our preliminary exploration of Hungarian data. On the outcome side, we 
should look for changes in the mix of benefits and the forms in which they are delivered as 
well as for signs of increased variability in these across enterprises. Concerning determinants 
of change, these may include the mandates, tax incentives, and regulations of government as 
well as reactions by government to changes in enterprise behavior; the cost of benefits to 
enterprises and the rights of enterprises to control cost items such as infrastructure; the needs 
or tastes of workers; disequilibrium pressures such as those leading to the shedding of 
workers and its implications for benefits. 
B. The Social Function Of Non-Wage Compensation 
In the discussion of the determinants of benefits based on the hedonic wage model, 
government policies played a central role, but our discussion treated them as exogenous. 
Government, however, is one of the main interpreters of what is social, and its actions are 
likely to change as thinking about social responsibilities change. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to explore the mind of policy makers, and there may not be a unified view on social 
needs and standards. Our concern is with what is done rather than what is said. We will 
examine benefits that could fit several possible social rationales. In particular, we will look 
' for benefits that are a form of social protection, those that involve the delivery of social 
services, commodity benefits, and benefits that do not fit any of these categories. Enterprise 
involvement is changing in each of these areas in directions that give insights into the 
concerns driving policy. 
The social rationale for commodity subsidies is perhaps the least clear, but in view of 
their extensive use, we allow the possibility that countries might consider them social. As one 
possible rationale, in the socialist economy fixed prices created shortages in which some 
goods were not available at all in markets and others were in chronically short supply. 
Enterprise commodity benefits could serve the social function of making goods available. 
Enterprises were generally not the sole source of a commodity, but provided a convenient 
supplement to what could be purchased in stores. With the opening of markets, it might be 
expected that the need for commodity benefits from enterprises would diminish. On the other 
hand, the period of transition in Hungary has become one of rapid inflation. While markets 
may be working, not all people can keep up with the price increases. The government might 
decide to offer commodity subsidies once more to protect people against the uncertain 
consequences of inflation (even though the hedonic wage theory of benefits suggests that if 
real benefits go up, real wages may go down). Since these two tendencies work in opposite 
directions, we may be able to observe only the net outcome - that is, the extent of 
commodity benefits. 
Turning to the role of enterprises in social services, in the socialist era, enterprises 
were responsible for a range of social services such as kindergartens and nurseries which 
might be provided by other agencies in other countries. Sometimes these services were 
limited to employees of the firm. In other cases, they were available to the whole community, 
in line with the view that the enterprise was a social entity. "The enterprises were not 
regarded as mere producers of goods . . . but rather a place where people were brought together 
to participate in the process of socialization and to create a 'new man.'4 If this view should 
recede with the progress of reform, enterprise obligations may also diminish. 
Finally, enterprise benefits may include some that are forms of social protection. 
Social protection benefits tend to share the common feature that they protect people against 
risks of income loss. Of course, the fact of income loss on its own is not sufficient to 
establish the social need for protection. There are many cases of income loss for which 
countries offer no protection. Generally, the feature distinguishing income losses deserving 
social protection is that there is some form of market failure - generally an insurance 
problem. There may also be a distribution problem. While government programs are one 
way to provide social protection, many countries also rely on enterprises to perform similar 
functions in areas such as pensions, disability insurance and health insurance. 
We will examine the extent to which enterprise benefits in Hungary serve a social 
protection function. There are reasons to expect increases in the extent of social protection in 
enterprises during the period of transition. First, in the process of restructuring, enterprises 
have sought ways to shed workers, but this has resulted in an increase in some forms of 
enterprise social protection. Enterprises might have tried to shift workers to social protection 
programs, a combination of their own and those of government. Or, the government might 
have mandated that they provide some form of social protection in exchange for being able to 
dismiss a worker. Second, fiscal pressures might have induced the state to cut benefits in its 
own programs or shift responsibilities to enterprises. The changes may have affected the 
overall availability of social protection benefits as well as the relative roles of enterprises and 
government. 
We have suggested several rationales for social involvement with enterprise benefits. 
These suggest a classification of benefits in terms of their possible social functions, those that 
are a form of social protection, commodity benefits, social services, and those that serve no 
social function. The extent of enterprise involvement in each of these areas may change, and 
we have suggested a number of reasons to expect changes. We will examine whether actual 
changes correspond with these expectations. The changes give an insight into the evolving 
social roles of enterprises. 
11. Trends in Compensation 
To provide an overview, Table 1 presents the trends in Hungary in overall 
compensation and its breakdown. The data were assembled by the Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office from the combination of "balance sheet reports" submitted by enterprises 
and information from government on its employees. The coverage is thus all employees. 
Data are presented for 1987 to 1992 to facilitate comparisons with subsequent data, but care is 
needed for the period before 1989. Following the introduction of an income tax, wages were 
increased in 1987 and 1988. The apparent increase in real wages for 1988 reflects only this 
one-time compensatory policy and not a trend. 
Table la shows that from 1989 when the transition began, there was a sharp drop of 
23% in the real wage bill because of rapid inflation. However, overall non-wage 
compensation went up during this period by 36%, offsetting some of the decline in real 
wages. The net decline in total compensation was thus only 17%. Table lb breaks down the 
change in the real wage bill into the change in employment and the change in real wages per 
worker. It turns out that employment fell substantially during this period, declining by 13% 
between 1989 and 1992. Thus, much of the decline in the real wage bill reflects the shedding 
of workers. For an individual who remained employed, the decline in the real wage was only 
12%. Moreover, the increase in non-wage compensation per worker was larger, 56%. Thus, 
the decline in total compensation per worker was only 5%. 
Table la. Structure of labor costs, enterprise and government employees (in billions of 1987 
forints). 
Change Change 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 (In %) (In %) 
1987- 1992 1989- 1992 
Wages 301.80 439.21 434.60 415.52 357.24 333.3 1 10% -23% 
Benefits in cash 3.90 2.77 1.70 1.38 1.02 2.52 -35% 48% 
Benefits in kind 10.70 8.05 6.22 5.17 4.55 3.80 -64% -39% 
Other wage-like inc. 
From government - - 5.70 4.59 4.59 8.16 43% 
From enterprises - - 36.93 49.84 52.82 54.29 47% 
Total, other wage-like 55.00 50.64 42.62 54.43 57.41 62.45 14% 47% 
Total, non-wage 69.60 61.46 50.54 60.98 62.99 68.78 - 1% 36% 
Total compensation 37 1.40 500.67 485.14 476.50 420.23 402.09 8% -17% 
Table I b. Real labor costs per worker (in 1987 forints per worker). 
Active earners (000) 5,589 5,548 5,505 5,472 5,304 4,796 -14% -13% 
Wages 53,999 79,166 78,947 75,937 67,354 69,495 29 % -12% 
Benefits in cash 698 499 309 252 192 526 -25 % 70% 
Benefits in kind 1,914 1,451 1,129 944 858 793 -59% -30% 
Other wage-like inc. 9,841 9,127 7,743 9,947 10,825 13,021 32% 68% 
Total, non-wage 12,453 11,078 9,181 11,143 11,875 14,340 15% 56% 
Total compensation 66,452 90,244 88,128 87,08 1 79,230 83,835 26% -5 % 
Table lc. Labor costs as percents of total compensation. 
Wages 
Benefits in cash 
Benefits in kind 
Other wage-like inc. 
From government 
From enterprises 
Total, other wage-like 
Total, non-wage 
Total compensation 
Sources: Compensation data: "National Accounts, Hungary 1991." Hungary Central Statistical Office, 
Budapest, 1993. Employment data: "Statistical Yearboook of Hungary." Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 
Budapest, 1993. 
It is risky to draw conclusions on the market offer curve of employers without holding 
other variables constant. Although we are unable to do so, our numbers are at least suggestive 
about the adjustment process. The disequilibrium was addressed mainly by the shedding of 
workers. There was only a small downward shift in enterprise iso-profit curves and in the 
market offer curve as suggested by the 5% fall in total compensation. Along the market offer 
curve, there was a shift from wages toward benefits. One of the limitations of this argument 
is that the increased non-wage benefits included some that went to support the workers who 
were shed; compensation per retained worker probably did go down more than indicated here, 
although the table does not have a breakdown of benefits between shed and retained workers. 
The percentage breakdown of total compensation is shown in Table Ic. Wages as a 
percent of compensation declined from 90% in 1989 to 83% in 1992 as the non-wage 
component accounts for a larger share. Table la also shows that non-wage compensation was 
not a monolithic whole. It divides non-wage compensation into three parts. Cash benefits 
include items such as sick pay or leave and scholarships. Benefits in kind include creches, 
kindergartens, sports, medical care, and recreation facilities. Benefits not in these categories 
are called "other wage-like income." This classification is not too informative, but it does 
show the sharply divergent patterns in specific benefits. Separate data for government and 
enterprise workers are available in the "other wage-like" category, but not for cash or in-kind 
benefits. Given these categories, cash and other wage-like benefits increased nearly 50% after 
1989, and benefits in-kind declined by nearly 40%. 
The increase in non-wage compensation raises questions about both the level and 
change in compensation in various enterprise types. Fajth and Lakatos provide evidence on 
the level of benefits by enterprise size.5 They find that in 1992, fringe benefits were actually a 
slightly larger percent of total compensation in small than in large enterprises. The difference, 
however, was largely in benefits that do not serve a social function. Even if small enterprises 
do not provide more benefits of a social nature, they also do not appear to provide fewer than 
do large enterprises. The data do not support the idea that non-wage benefits are confined to 
large enterprises. There is clearly a need for more research on differences in benefits across 
enterprises of various types. 
The structure of labor costs in Hungary can be compared to that in European 
Community countries because the Hungarian Central Statistical Office in 1992 conducted an 
enterprise-based survey of the cost of labor, following closely the Eurostat survey carried out 
be the European Community. However, Eurostat data are available only for firms in 
manufacturing for 1988. Table 2 shows the structure of labor costs for firms with 20 or more 
workers in manufacturing for four EC countries in 1988 and for Hungary in 1992. Table 2 is 
thus more limited in coverage than Table 1 in that it excludes workers in general government, 
community and personal services, agriculture, the military, unpaid family members and 
enterprises of less than 20 persons, covering somewhat less than 70% of active earners. It 
also classifies costs differently, following the EC convention of distinguishing direct 
remuneration, compulsory or statutory benefits, and benefits that are customarily or 
voluntarily provided by enterprises. 
Table 2 shows that total direct remuneration in Hungary is a substantially lower 
fraction of total compensation than in all the EC countries. However, statutory costs are 
substantially higher in Hungary. These include enterprise contributions to public social 
insurance programs. Combining these, Hungary is only a little lower. On the other hand, 
Hungary is the highest in terms of customary benefits. In this category, Germany and the 
U.K. are lowest, while France is slightly behind Hungary. Customary benefits include some 
which serve only business purposes and others which may serve a social function as well. To 
get a rough estimate of the breakdown, we assume as strictly business expenses items such as 
honorariums or payments to member of the boards of directors of firms, travel expenses when 
at work, grants to cover the expenses for celebrating parties on festive occasions, and 
payments for performing special task. The remaining customary expenditures we label as 
"social." By this admittedly arbitrary standard, French enterprises offer the most social 
benefits, Hungary a little less, and Germany and the U.K. the least. 
The customary benefits in Table 2 are probably close to the total non-wage 
compensation in Table 1, although we lack information on the specific components in 
Table 1. One discrepancy is that sick pay or leave is included as a cash benefit in Table 1, but 
is a form of direct compensation in Table 2. Another source of difference is that Table 1 
covers all workers and Table 2 those in manufacturing enterprises with more than 20 
employees. The figures in the two tables are close, but not identical as might be expected, 
Table 2. The structure of labor costs for manual and non-manual workers in firms of 20+ 
employees in manufacturing; 1988 for EC countries and 1992 for Hungary (percent 
of total labor costs) 
Country Germany France Holland U.K. Hungary 
Earnings 56.3 52.2 55.1 73.1 45.0 
Bonuses 9.1 6.5 7.7 1.4 7.1 
Days not worked 11.5 9.7 10.9 11.4 4.7 
Total, direct remuneration 76.9 68.4 73.6 85.9 56.8 
Statutory cost 16.5 19.2 15.8 7.3 29.0 
Total, direct & statutory 93.4 87.6 89.4 93.2 85.8 
Customary expenditures 6.5 12.0 10.6 6.8 14.2 
Social 4.3 8.5 7.1 4.2 7.3 
Other 2.2 3.5 3.5 2.6 6.9* 
Source: Labor Costs 1988, Vol. 1, Principle Results pp. 164-165. Euro-Stat 1992, and Labor Cost Survey 1992, 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office. 
* These include customary expenditures for travel, payment for special tasks in-kind, honorariums, vocational 
training, jubilee gratuities, payment for persons like members of the board who are not on the normal payroll, 
and other. 
given these discrepancies. Concerning the days not worked, Table 2 shows that Hungary 
ranks lowest among the countries in the table. In the U.K., Germany, and most recently 
Holland and Hungary, the first days of sick leave are paid by the enterprise. In Hungary, the 
enterprise obligation has recently been raised from 3 to 10 days, but it is as high as 6 weeks in 
Germany. 
In view of the differences in coverage between Tables 1 and 2, Table 3 presents a 
comparison of benefits between manufacturing and all industries for 1992. This table shows a 
number of specific benefits which are included in customary expenditures. We chose ones 
which might be considered to have social functions. They are expressed as percents of total 
customary expenditures. 
Table 3. Enterprise social benefits: all industries and manufacturing, 1992 (expenditures as 
percents of customary expenditures). 
Type Of Social Benefit All Industries* Manufacturing 
Cost of welfare services 19.7 18.6 
Grants to credit unions 0.8 0.5 
Contributions to disability 0.4 0.3 
Contribution to early 
retirement 4.9 7.3 
Severance pay 8.0 11.5 
Sickness benefits 4.6 5.2 
Cost and reimbursements of 
fares for going to work 6.2 7.0 
Contribution to private 
insurance 0.8 0.7 
Totally customary exp. as % 
of total compensation 14.1 14.2 
* Excludes general government, agricultural, small enterprise. 
We found limited data on the changes in specific benefits over time which are 
presented in Table 4a. The data for 1987 were collected by the Ministry of Finance from the 
enterprise "balance sheet" reports as well as from the accounting reports of cooperatives and 
public institutions. The data for 1992 are based on estimates made by experts drawing on 
sources such as preliminary tax information, banks, and social security  report^.^ The data 
source for Table 4 has classified non-wage benefits into two categories, "social wages in 
kind" and "social wages in cash." Both categories, however, include benefits that serve only 
business purposes with no clear social function. We tried to identify such business benefits, 
denoted by an asterisk and placed at the bottom of each category. We distinguish them from 
the other benefits which might have a social function and which we call "enterprise social 
benefits" in each category. The total in each category we call the "social wage," following 
Hungarian usage. All of these categories are in some degree arbitrary, but they help illustrate 
some of the differences among benefits. 
Total customary expenditures are about the same percent of total compensation in both 
manufacturing and industry as a whole. This suggests that differences in coverage should not 
be the source of major differences between Tables 1 and 2. On the other hand, there are 
differences in specific benefits. The biggest differences are in early retirement and severance 
pay. This probably reflects a greater willingness by enterprises in manufacturing to rely on 
exit strategies than other enterprises. Tables 1 and 3 both suggest the importance of 
examining specific benefits since they may have diverging patterns over time or across 
industries. 
The nominal data for 1992 seem to show substantial increases in most categories, but 
this was a period of rapid inflation, the consumer price index for 1992 being 2.89 times its 
1987 value. When all values are expressed in 1987 prices, it is clear that many of the items 
have declined in real value, sometimes substantially, while others have gone up. Total real 
enterprise social benefits in kind went down by 16%. In contrast, total enterprise social 
benefits in cash went up by 19%. This left the combined total of enterprise social benefits of 
both kinds up slightly by 3%. In other words, the total of social benefits originating in 
enterprises was fairly stable, but there was a large adjustment in the composition of benefits 
away from benefits in kind and toward cash benefits. If we had relied on the official 
categories involving the "social wage," this result would have been partly obscured. The 
combined social wage is fairly stable, down by only 3%; the social wage in kind is down by 
15%, similar to the enterprise social benefits in kind; but the social wage in cash barely grew 
in contrast to the enterprise social benefit. 
The finding of stability in overall benefits is probably a result of the time period. In 
Table 1 also there was little change in total non-wage compensation between 1987 and 1992 
even though there was a big increase between 1989 and 1992. Unfortunately, the detailed 
breakdown of benefits is available only for 1987 and 1992. The important point, however, is 
that data on non-wage compensation as an aggregate does not reveal the divergent trends in 
specific benefits. 
Looking at the detailed benefits, there are several items such as food, clothing, and 
rent which are subsidized both in kind and in cash. While the real cash subsidies for these 
went up substantially, the in-kind subsidies either went down, or in the case of uniforms, rose 
much less. It seems that rather than give up benefits during this period of reform, enterprises 
have shifted toward cash and away from in-kind delivery. 
Table 4a. Social wages in cash and in kind (in millions of forints). 
1987 1992 Percent 
Current Ft Current Ft Real Ft Change 
(1 987 Prices) (1 992 Prices) (1 987 Prices) ( 1987 Prices) 
Social wage in cash 
Sick pay 2,450 600 208 -92% 
Sick leave - 10,000 3,460 na 
Early retirement, disability - 3,500 1,211 na 
Social aid 970 750 260 -73% 
Travel disbursement 9,000 2 1,000 7,266 - 19% 
Rent compensation 800 4,000 1,384 73% 
Canteen bonuses, cash 1,500 6,000 2,076 38% 
Clothing 300 1,900 657 119% 
Grants for needy 430 650 225 -48% 
Earning supplement, disabled - 400 138 na 
Severance pay - 4,500 1,557 n a 
Subtotal: Enterprise social 15,450 53,300 1 8,443 19% 
benefits in cash 
*Wages paid for holidays 28,000 70,000 24,22 1 -13% 
*Private car compensation 250 1,200 4 15 66% 
*Payments for foundations - 6,000 2,076 na 
Total: Social wage in cash 43,700 130,500 45,156 3% 
Social wage in kind 
Nursery 320 480 166 -48% 
Kindergarten 400 630 2 18 -46% 
Recreation 2,900 4,800 1,661 -43% 
Culture 850 1,300 450 -47% 
Sport 1,500 2,400 830 -45% 
Social care 720 1,300 450 -38% 
Medical care 300 500 173 -42% 
Subsidized housing loans 200 3,000 1,038 4 19% 
Subsidized rent 1,500 2,500 865 -42% 
Uniforms 1,500 4,500 1,557 4% 
Free canteen bonuses 2,800 8,000 2,768 - 1 % 
Private insurance premiums 2,000 692 na 
Subtotal: Enterprise social 12,990 31,410 10,869 -16% 
benefits in kind 
*Training 700 1,100 38 1 -46% 
*Company cars - 4,000 1,384 na 
*Free shares - 3,000 1,038 na 
*Bonuses 8,000 14,000 4,844 -39% 
Total: Social wage in kind 2 1,690 53,5 10 18,516 - 15% 
Combined totals 
Enterprise social benefits 28,440 84,7 10 29,3 1 1 3% 
Enterprise social wage 65,390 184,O 10 63,67 1 -3% 
Table 4b. Employer and public contributions ( in millions of current forints). 
Social wage and social income 
1987 1992 
Forints Percent Forints Percent 
Cash 
Enterprise 
Social benefits 15,450 8% 53,300 8% 
Social wage 43,700 22% 130,500 19% 
Public 158,900 78% 549,500 8 1 % 
Total 202,600 100% 680,000 100% 
In kind 
Enterprise 
Social benefits 12,990 10% 31,410 8% 
Social wage 2 1,690 17% 53,510 14% 
Public 102,310 83% 341,090 86% 
Total 124,000 100% 394,600 100% 
Combined 
Enterprise 
Social benefits 28,440 9% 84,710 8% 
Social wage 65,390 20% 184,010 17% 
Public 261,210 80% 890,590 83% 
Total 326,600 100% 1,074,600 100% 
Social benefits and social income 
Cash 
Enterprise 
Social benefits 15,450 9% 53,300 9% 
Public 158,900 91% 549,500 91% 
Total 174,350 100% 602,800 100% 
In kind 
Enterprise 
Social benefits 12,990 11% 31,410 8% 
Public 102,310 89% 341,090 92% 
Total 1 15,300 100% 372,500 100% 
Combined 
Enterprise 
Social benefits 28,440 10% 84,710 9% 
Public 261,210 90% 890,590 91% 
Total 289,650 100% 975,300 100% 
The balance sheet data are accompanied by estimates of public spending, termed 
"social income," both in cash and in kind, although there is no breakdown on the public side. 
These figures can give an estimate of the share of enterprise social benefits in total social 
spending, shown in Table 4b. The top of the table presents the calculations using the entire 
social wage as the enterprise contribution. The bottom uses only the enterprise contribution to 
social benefits which in principle is more appropriate, but in practice is limited by our ability 
to distinguish benefits which have a social function. Thus, our discussion should be 
considered only suggestive, based as it is on our particular designation of which benefits are 
social. Enterprise social benefits contribute close to 10 percent of the total. For cash benefits, 
enterprise and public shares remain constant in 1987 and 1992, indicating that the public 
benefits increased at the same rate as those of the enterprise. For in-kind benefits, the public 
share rose: public spending in kind increased 15% in real terms while enterprise spending 
declined. While the public sector was substituting for enterprise in-kind benefits, the data do 
not show which public benefits went up. Because of the decline in enterprise benefits in kind, 
the overall enterprise contribution went down slightly from 10% to 9%. Total public 
spending increased by 18% in real terms. While the majority of social spending comes from 
government, enterprises play a role which, although limited, may not negligible. 
111. Evidence on the Determinants of Benefit Changes 
We suggested above several kinds of variables which might be expected to affect 
benefits including their cost to enterprises, the needs or tastes of workers, the pressure to shed 
workers, and the array of government policies which affect benefits. Unfortunately, we lack 
the quantitative data on costs and needs that would permit a full evaluation of the 
determinants of change. Instead, we first examine government policies which have played a 
major role in stimulating changes. Second, we focus on the hypothesis of increased 
variability across enterprises, suggesting the cost, need, and policy factors that might account 
for the observed pattern. 
A. Government Policy and Benefits 
Even in the socialist era, Hungarian benefit policy did not fit the simple model of the 
government mandating uniform standards for all enterprises. Before 1968, planners did 
determine benefits in considerable detail. After 1968, however, the planners specified a 
minimum welfare fund and enterprises had more discretion over how it was used.7 It is likely 
that enterprises took advantage of this to get around restrictions on wages: wages apparently 
were more tightly monitored than benefits which became the easier channel for increasing 
total compensation. While these employer practices may have increased the variability of 
benefit packages across enterprises, there were also elements of a social philosophy relating to 
benefits which might have encouraged a degree of uniformity. 
Even in socialist countries, the link between general philosophy and practical policy 
may be sufficiently weak that there can be variations in the implementation of policy. 
Nevertheless, there were some prevailing attitudes concerning policy which may have 
influenced the direction of benefit practices. There was, for example, a view that benefits - 
both in general and specific types - enhanced worker productivity. In other words, there was 
a theory of motivation relating to benefits, and planned economies tried to encourage 
managers to follow the same theories. There was also a view that certain social functions 
were the responsibility of enterprises and that enterprises should play a central role in the 
development of a socialist society. These ideological views could have helped shape 
conventions concerning the appropriate design of benefit policy and so could have contributed 
to uniform practices. 
We lack the evidence to distinguish the forces toward uniformity and those toward 
diversity in their effects on enterprise benefit policies in the period before 1989. However, 
the transition beginning in 1989 brought another major change as the obligation by enterprises 
to maintain welfare funds was eliminated altogether. Moreover, the ideological 
underpinnings which might have contributed to the old conventions for benefit policy may 
have weakened. There is thus reason to believe that enterprises may have acquired more 
freedom to design their own policies. on the other hand, they are not totally free. A series of 
new government regulations has influenced their actions. There are some explicit new 
mandates. However, in many cases, the new policies offer incentives which allow enterprises 
an element of choice. Consider some examples of government policies. 
Mandates 
The state itself contributes toward payments for sickness, but also mandates enterprise 
contributions. In 1985-1991 the enterprise was required to cover sick pay for the first 3 
days of sickness. Since 1992, the government has been shifting the burden of payments 
toward enterprises by requiring sick leave for the first 10 days of sickness. 
The state has mandated that 85% of the cost of travel to work be financed by the 
enterprise for workers who commute to work from outside of the city limits. 
Incentives 
There is an incentive for food benefits in the form of a provision for tax exemption for 
food amounting to 1200 forints per month per worker. Enterprises take advantage of the 
exemption in more than one way. Many firms opt to provide their employees with food 
coupons which permit them to purchase food items in the chain store, Julius Meinl. Other 
enterprises invest in a highly subsidized canteen. Some do both. 
In the case of clothing there is an allowance which is tax exempt, but there is also a 
subsidy for uniforms. The government has sought to reduce the spending on uniforms by 
imposing more stringent standards for the items to be allowed as work clothing, but 
enforcement has been difficult. Itemized reimbursement invoices have been required, but 
as Table 4 shows, real spending on uniform subsidies continued to rise slightly. 
In 1991 there was a general household energy subsidy for electricity, gas, and central 
heating, but it was phased out. 
The government has also been involved with the issue of shedding workers. On the 
one hand, there is an interest in encouraging enterprises to become more efficient even if this 
means shedding workers. On the other hand, dismissed workers may be eligible for 
unemployment insurance, increasing the burden on that system. To discourage dismissals, the 
government in 1991 mandated severance payments. An enterprise is required to pay from 3 
months to 1 year of severance pay, depending on years of service of the dismissed worker. As 
an alternative to outright dismissal, the government has also encouraged the use of early 
retirement. When enterprise reorganization requires a substantial reduction in employment, 
workers with 3 years to go before retirement can be offered early retirement benefits. The 
benefits are paid out of the public pension system, but there is a cost to the enterprise. It must 
pay 50% of the early retirement pension and the state the rest. The state thus has been 
imposing costs on enterprises for dismissing workers while also opening new choices 
concerning forms of dismissal. 
B. The Extent of Benefits and Their Variations 
Changes in government policy and in enterprise costs have tended to affect all 
enterprises. However, the hedonic wage model of benefits suggests that different enterprises 
will respond differently to the same stimuli. One of the important features of the new 
regulatory environment is that in many areas enterprises have more choices. Government 
policy relies more on incentives than on outright mandates although mandates do remain. 
Thus, we expect that the transition period should be characterized by more variations in 
benefits across enterprises. Unfortunately, our detailed benefit data in Table 4 show only 
aggregate expenditures for each benefit type. From this data, we cannot distinguish changes 
that result because all enterprises change their benefits in the same proportion from those that 
result because some enterprises change while others do not. Instead, we rely on our case 
studies for evidence on specific benefits. We look at the response of benefits to a changing 
environment, the factors producing the change, and whether the responses are common across 
enterprises or whether they vary. 
Food. Food benefits are one of the largest benefit areas. At Ikarus, a bus 
manufacturing company, nearly 40% of benefits were for food. Food benefits include both 
coupons and company canteens. From Table 4 it is clear that the combination of these two for 
enterprises as a whole is a large benefit, but on average not as large as at Ikarus. It is also 
clear from Table 4 that in the aggregate there has been a substantial shift to increased use of 
food coupons and a small real decline in canteens. On the other hand, the case studies show 
that the shift has not been uniform across enterprises. 
Given that enterprises now have a degree of choice between providing food benefits 
through canteens, subsidized coupons, or not at all, it is not a priori clear which option an 
enterprise will choose. Because of the tax subsidy, it is cheaper for an enterprise to give 
workers a forint of food coupons rather than wages, up to the limit of the subsidy. The choice 
between coupons and canteens should also depend on the relative cost, but this is more 
difficult to estimate. There are not only the direct costs of the food in both cases, but also 
indirect costs. For example, the availability of restaurants near the enterprise may affect the 
time required for lunch which is a cost to it. Enterprises will choose the form of food benefit 
based on its full cost. The hedonic wage theory suggests that enterprises will also choose 
benefit packages in order to appeal to the desired kind of worker. Three examples illustrate 
the variety of responses among enterprises. 
Ikarus allows workers choice. Individuals can apparently choose the subsidized 
canteen or individual food coupons. In contrast, Ganz-Ansaldo enterprise, a producer of 
heavy electrical equipment, relies exclusively on its canteen. Ganz is the Hungarian partner 
of an Italian enterprise for which high quality food has symbolic and instrumental 
consequences. It tried to eliminate as many social benefits as i t  could. The canteen, however, 
was not only kept, but improved. A three course, high quality meal is available for only 40 
forints. The tax exempt value of the food coupon is absorbed in the cost of the canteen and 
the firm adds a subsidy. This means that the food coupon option is not available as a direct 
benefit to workers. 
The third example is Dunaferr, a state-owned enterprise producing steel sheets and 
metal products such as radiators. It is a large factory outside of Budapest employing about 
30,000 workers. It provides a canteen, but seeks to limit its use through an indirect form of 
rationing. Only half the workers receive it due to shift work. The meal is only served at 
lunch, and the transportation schedule of returning workers to their homes by the company 
bus is not integrated with the timing of the mid-day meal. As these illustrations show there is 
variation across enterprises relating not only to the cost of the benefits, but also to the kinds 
of workers the enterprise seeks to attract. 
Kindergartens. There has been a sharp reduction in enterprise real spending on 
kindergartens and creches as seen in Table 4. A UNICEF report concluded that the reduction 
"... is fueled by financial difficulties facing most firms and by privatization of the sector 
which strengthens the profit motive and tends to reduce the average size of firms. 
Terminations of government regulations requiring enterprises to provide these services, and 
easing of public expectations have also contributed to their decline. In addition, with 
increases in short term supply of labor, enterprises no longer find it necessary to supply child 
care facilities to attract workers ..."8 The argument about financial difficulties is not 
convincing because other benefits are increasing nonetheless. However, changes in 
government regulations and declining need seem to be relevant determinants of the changes. 
According to the hedonic wage model, workers' preferences are important 
determinants of benefits. When workers no longer need a benefit - when it no longer has 
value to them - the benefit loses its value to enterprises also who want to use benefits to 
attract and retain workers. Government policy is relevant to the extent it allows enterprises to 
reduce the provision of the benefit. 
In Hungary, there has been a clear trend toward an aging labor force, and there has 
been a general decline in fertility. The crude birth rate per 1,000 population has declined from 
140 in 1980 to 110 for the first 6 months of 1993. The decline in enterprise provision of 
kindergartens and nurseries has been proportionately greater. In 1991, enterprises accounted 
for only 4% of all the children enrolled in kindergartens and nurseries, and by 1993 only 
These numbers can be compared to the figures in 1970 when 10.3% of children attending pre- 
school education received the service from the employer. On the one hand, this shows that 
even in the socialist period, the work place was not the primary vehicle for the provision of 
child care. On the other hand, enterprises have responded to the demographic change by 
cutting back sharply their involvement in this area. There has been a pronounced shift from 
enterprises to regional governments and more recently to nonprofits as sponsors of child care. 
Benefits requiring physical infrastructure. A number of the traditional benefits of 
Hungarian enterprises required substantial physical investment including housing, recreation 
homes, and health care facilities, as well as the kindergartens and canteens already discussed. 
There is a general movement away from benefits relying on enterprise infrastructure 
investments, although the details differ by benefit and by enterprise. It is plausible to argue 
that the costs of providing benefits based on enterprise infrastructure investments are higher 
than alternative forms of delivery, although we do not have direct evidence to confirm this. 
However, the observed pattern of enterprises seeking to cut back such investments is 
consistent with the idea that these are perceived as high cost ventures which profit-driven 
enterprises can no longer afford. Consider the adjustments enterprises have made with respect 
to infrastructure in several areas. 
Housing. It used to be common for enterprises to build and then own dormitories for 
its workers. The dormitories accommodated primarily relatively unskilled workers who came 
in from the countryside to work. In the case of Ikarus, most of these workers were let go and 
the infrastructure sold off or put to other use. This happens to be a case with substantial 
infrastructure, but it is not clear that the cost of the investment was the decisive factor in the 
change. The infrastructure was originally needed to attract and retain the rural workers. But 
since the enterprise shedding its unskilled commuters, the dormitories were not needed. 
Interestingly, enterprises did develop new housing subsidies which seem to be targeted 
to keeping selected kinds of workers. Enterprises have subsidized middle level workers by 
reimbursing their rental costs in  the community where the company was located. There is 
also a program to reimburse housing loans, but the funds involved are generally limited and 
appear to be targeted at upper level workers. Enterprises seem to have avoided direct 
infrastructure investments in the case of these new types of housing benefits. 
Recreation homes. There is a long tradition of subsidizing holiday homes for 
weekends and for summer and winter vacations. Almost all firms have these vacation homes 
and many have tried with varying degrees of success to get rid of some or all of them. There 
was an effort to replace this form of benefit with vacation subsidies. This is an area where the 
infrastructure cost may have been a dominant reason for the transition, but even here there 
were also considerations on how to use this benefit to attract and retain workers. 
The move away from infrastructure in this area has been limited by practical 
considerations. The initial effort of enterprises was to sell their vacation homes. But this 
crowded the market with surplus hotels and a very limited number of buyers. This lowered 
their price and made the option of selling off the property less attractive. This led to a search 
for new alternatives. Contracting was one option, where the contractor would charge market 
level rents. Another was to retain the property, but use it for other purposes such as training 
centers. These are apparently adjustments that may eventually lead to the sale of the property 
if market conditions permit. 
As enterprises took away this traditional subsidy, it seems that many compensated 
workers by introducing cash vacation subsidies. This part of the story is consistent with the 
idea that cash subsidies are a cheaper way of providing vacation benefits than company 
hotels, although this depends, of course, on the level of subsidy provided. There is, however, 
an indication that the old form of subsidy was targeted rather narrowly. The TARKI data 
show that only 6 to 13 percent of workers nationally made use of the facilities. We found 
similar levels in our case study at Dunafeer. The cash subsidy may be targeted at a different 
group and in this way more effectively help the enterprise retain and attract the kinds of 
workers it wants. Additional data and tests would be needed to distinguish the roles of 
infrastructure costs and appeal to workers as factors explaining the movement away from 
enterprise-run hotels toward vacation subsidies. 
Health Clinics. Enterprises have frequently sponsored health clinics. There is a clear 
rationale for having a facility to deal with accidents or illnesses that originate at work, in other 
words with the health externalities of the work environment. Once the facility is in place, it 
may have a capacity greater than needed just to cover occupational injuries. Indeed, some 
enterprise clinics provided a broad range of general health services. However, it was also 
common for enterprise clinics to be run as a kind of joint venture with the local government. 
The enterprise created the clinic and paid for the facilities and equipment. But the local 
government paid the wages of the doctors, nurses and medical personnel. A study using the 
Hungarian household panel data reports that enterprise health benefits have been the second 
most common benefit after meals. It found that 34% to 38% of public and mixed sector 
workers receive it respectively compared to 20% in the completely private sector." 
In the new market oriented environment, a tendency may be emerging toward buying 
health services rather than providing them directly. In 1993 new legislation was passed 
making it possible to purchase individual health care. If individual purchases become 
widespread, enterprises may decide to divest their health facilities, selling perhaps to private 
health providers or perhaps for different functions altogether. The national data from TARKI 
show that between 20-38% of workers receive health services through the enterprise. 
However, the data from Ikarus show that only 4% of its welfare costs go for health compared 
to 12% for recreation houses. 
There is some evidence that firms are providing workers with health insurance 
benefits, which supplements the health care covered by the public scheme. The future role of 
the enterprise in this area will depend on the nature of what is covered in the public insurance 
scheme. The less generous the public coverage, the more intense the pressure for enterprises 
to cover the cost. Moreover, as with food and clothing coupons, tax forgiveness will be an 
important determinant of the role of the enterprise. 
Finally, local government may play a role in the evolution of benefits. If a company 
owns a health clinic (or sports stadium or swimming pool), the value of the asset is in part 
determined by whether the new owner can get a variance to use the property as it wants. This 
puts the local government in a strategic bargaining position to deal with the enterprise facility. 
For example, the government may impose restrictions on the use of the facility. We were told 
of a hotel in  Budapest that could not privatize because the swimming pool had been open to 
the community and the potential new owners wanted the facility to be limited to the hotel's 
clientele. Historically, enterprises served their own clientele in Budapest, whereas in Berlin 
they were more likely to serve the general community, but there are exceptions. There have 
been other cases where local governments have invested in facilities that enterprises wanted to 
divest. 
Benefits for terminated workers. There has been growth in benefits such as severance 
pay and early retirement. The determinants of these will be discussed together with their 
social functions in the next section. 
IV. Social Functions Of Non-Wage Compensation 
In this section, we examine benefits in terms of several possible social rationales. In 
particular, we look for benefits that are a form of social protection, those that involve the 
delivery of social services, commodity benefits, and benefits that do not fit any of these 
categories. The tendencies associated with these groupings offer insights into the concerns 
driving policy. We found data on the change in particular benefits between 1989 and 1992 for 
one large company, GE-Tungsram, shown in Table 5. It gives a one case illustration of 
developments in these categories. 
A. Social Protection 
During the socialist period, social protection in Hungary was the responsibility 
primarily of government. Enterprises made social insurance contributions to the government, 
but the government was responsible for delivering most benefits. Since 1989, there has been 
rapid growth in enterprise benefits that could be considered social protection. The new 
benefits, however, are used largely in conjunction with the shedding of workers. Social 
protection is generally defined as protecting people against the risk of income loss, and that is 
what these benefits are doing. Early retirement and severance pay have been rapidly growing 
enterprise benefits, and these are used primarily for workers who are being dismissed. As 
discussed earlier, severance pay has been mandated by government, and the government 
allows pensions to be paid three years early when workers are shed in a reorganization, but the 
Table 5. GE-Tungsram compensation (in percents of total compensation). 
1989 1993 
Wages 65.38% 57.18% 
Social security contributions 29.10% 30.03% 
Benefits 
1. Social protection 
Early retirement - 4.35% 
Severance pay - 2.6 1 % 
2. Social & health services 
Child care 0.32% 0.12% 
Medical care 0.57% 0.22% 
Social support 0.27% 0.14% 
3. Commodity subsidies 
Meal allowance 1.23% 2.10% 
Housing support 0.02% 0.16% 
Vacation support 0.09% 0.03% 
4. Miscellaneous 
Scholarship support 0.1 1% 0.01% 
Retraining costs - 0.02% 
Sick pay 0.30% 0.73% 
Legal service 0.04% 0.04% 
Other 2.57% 2.26% 
Total Benefits 5.52% 12.79% 
Total Compensation 100.00% 100.00% 
enterprise must pay half the cost. This is an area where government policy initiated the 
benefits, but enterprise decisions determine the extent of their use. The government has in 
effect set a price for dismissing workers in terms of benefits that must be given. Each 
enterprise then can evaluate the trade-off between the costs of keeping workers and the costs 
of dismissing them, where different enterprises may make different choices. 
In the case of GE-Tungsram, these two benefits in 1993 amounted to nearly 7% of 
total compensation and over half of benefits, although they did not even exist in 1989. It is 
noteworthy that Tungsram does not consider these two items to be "social benefits" although 
it does report their amounts. Indeed, there are other benefits which it also does not consider 
social, such as supplementary pensions and supplementary death and disability benefits, 
which it does not even report explicitly as part of its compensation costs. We have data from 
Ikarus for just one year, but the only one of these enterprise social protection costs reported is 
pensions. There apparently are not standard procedures for identifying social components of 
benefits, and social protection benefits provided by enterprises are often overlooked 
altogether. 
The high severance pay and early retirement benefits are reflections of the shedding 
of workers during the period of transition and are thus likely to be temporary. However, other 
developments may produce long-run changes in enterprise social protection benefits. In 
December 1993 the Hungarian Parliament adopted an Act of Mutual Supplementary Pension 
and Health Insurance. The preamble of the bill provides a statement of the general purpose: 
"It has become increasingly clear over the course of the past decade that the State 
budget is unable to cover the ever growing expenditures of the uniform compulsory 
social security system . . . It has become clear that in the future only that system will 
be viable, which takes into account the principle of self-reliance . . . financed by fees 
from the membership and by other contribution supplements ... the goal is the reform of 
the social security system . . . by reducing the excessive role undertaken by the state." 
While the state has initiated increases in the social protection benefits to assist workers 
in the case of dismissal, the reforms in the case of regular pensions and health care do not 
seem to aim at an increase. Rather, the goal apparently is to shift responsibilities from itself 
to enterprises. 
B. Social Services 
In contrast to social protection benefits where certain enterprise responsibilities have 
been increasing, enterprise involvement in social services has been declining. Although 
health insurance is often considered a form of social protection, we classified it here along 
with social services, because the focus is on the delivery of health services. Insurance is 
social protection to the extent that it meets unexpectedly high medical expenses. Hungarian 
enterprise clinics began with a focus on work-related services. Even when they have 
expanded coverage, the government has shared in the expenses. Thus, we treat this sector as 
if the government meets the unexpected insurance needs, while the enterprise provides 
ongoing services. 
In the case of Tungsram, all three of the items we list under social services have 
declined. Similarly, in Table 4 nursery, kindergarten, social care, and medical care went 
down substantially. The child care has already been discussed: with the decline in fertility, 
enterprises no longer find it necessary to appeal to workers by offering this benefit. However, 
the enterprise reductions are greater than the overall decline in the level of these services. 
Rather, the enterprise reductions are part of a shift in responsibilities to other sectors - local 
governments and nonprofit organizations. This is true of health clinics as well. Enterprises 
are selling their clinics or sharing them with local governments. There is a shift away from 
enterprise health clinics, but not necessarily away from health altogether because other 
entities are substituting for enterprises. 
With the 1993 legislation to encourage health insurance, the role of enterprises in 
health insurance, which is a social protection benefit, may eventually increase. But the 
change that has already taken place is in the area of enterprise-provided health services, and 
these have declined. 
C. Commodity Benefits 
Certain commodity benefits have been big growth areas. table 4 showed big increases 
in spending on food and clothing benefits, at least in the form of cash rather than in kind. The 
Tungsram case shows a big increase for food, but there is not a separate entry for clothing. A 
study using the Hungarian Household Panel data reports that support for meals is the most 
common benefit. About 68-69% of public and mixed sector workers receive i t  and 53% of 
those in the private sector." 
The social significance of commodity benefits is not completely clear. We suggested 
that they may have been intended to assist workers facing market shortages. More recently, 
they may have served as protection against inflation. But they are large not simply because of 
enterprise business policy. The state has been actively involved in setting regulations and 
designing tax incentives to encourage their use. Whatever the underlying social rationale, 
they are a part - and a relatively large one - of enterprise social benefits. 
D. Miscellaneous Benefits 
There are many benefits that do not fit neatly in any of the above categories. Sick pay 
in its original conception is social protection in that it provides income support in the case of 
income losses from short-term sickness. However, it is often used by workers simply as 
support for days not worked. In view of the extent of the moral hazard problem, we did not 
classify it as social protection. On the other hand, the government has been actively involved 
in financing this benefit. The increase in enterprise sick pay expenses reflects the government 
policy of transferring more of the responsibility for this benefit to enterprises by requiring 
them to pay for 10 days instead of the previous 3 days of sickness. 
Other miscellaneous benefits in the Tungsram case declined, as have many for 
enterprises as a whole. 
E. Distributional Impacts 
One area where benefits may have social consequences relates to their distribution. 
We did not examine the distribution of benefits, but a recent study by Newbery produced a 
surprising finding. His focus was actually on prices and their decontrol rather than benefits. 
He asked "whether the price changes that have taken place since the tax reforms of 1988 have 
had an adverse effect on the distribution of purchasing power. The rather surprising answer is 
that changes in relative prices appear to have been uncorrelated with distributional 
characteristics. This is consistent with the view that the original set of subsidies and taxes 
were poorly targeted on distributional grounds, combined with the observation ... that there is 
little variation in distributional characteristics that would allow indirect taxes and subsidies 
much purchase on distribution."12 There is some evidence to suggest that as the subsidies 
were removed, they were partially replaced by tax exempt social benefits in enterprise. 
Enterprise benefits may have offset the decline in the subsidies and this might account for part 
of the reason that Newbery does not detect distributional effects. 
V. Conclusion 
One of the major developments accompanying the economic transition in Hungary has 
been a sharp drop in the real wage bill amounting to 23% between 1989 and 1992. Much of 
this reduction was accomplished by shedding workers during this period, 13% of the work 
force. For those workers who remained employed, the decline in the real wage per worker 
was 12%. At the same time, however, real non wage compensation increased by 36%, or on a 
per worker basis, by 56%. The increase in real non-wage compensation per worker has offset 
much of the decline in wages, resulting in a net decline in real compensation per worker of 
only 5%. Of course, some of the benefits did go to terminated workers; thus the decline in 
compensation per retained worker may have been somewhat greater. 
Although non-wage compensation as a whole has increased dramatically, not all 
benefits have moved in tandem. There have been large increases in some benefits - mainly 
those more cash-like - and large reductions in others - mainly those given in kind. 
However, the classification of benefits is irregular, with different benefits included in different 
data sources. Since there are such divergent trends across benefits, very different pictures can 
emerge concerning trends, depending on how benefits are measured. To understand better 
what these trends mean, we asked first what factors have determined the changes in benefits, 
and second what social functions enterprise benefits might have served. 
In accord with the hedonic wage model, our case studies suggest that enterprise 
benefits have responded both to the cost of benefits relative to wages and to the preferences of 
workers concerning benefits and wages. On the cost side, government has been active in 
reducing the costs of benefits for commodities such as food and clothing by exempting a basic 
cash subsidy from taxes. Enterprises have responded, and in varying ways, designing benefit 
packages to attract and retain the kinds of workers that seem most suitable to them. There has 
also been a clear tendency for enterprises to cut back on benefits requiring substantial 
infrastructure investment which could reflect cost concerns - an attempt by enterprises to 
find less expensive ways to deliver benefits. However, the infrastructure cutbacks could also 
result from changes in worker needs and preferences, and cost considerations are likely to 
interact with the needs and preferences in affecting benefits. This study gives only a 
preliminary indication of the determinants of change because it is based on the qualitative 
evidence from our case studies. More definitive results depend on collecting quantitative data 
across firms and performing more rigorous tests. 
Our other major question concerns the social functions of enterprise benefits. During 
the period of transition, a realignment of social responsibilities has begun between enterprises 
and other sectors. Social protection, for example, had previously been provided primarily by 
government. But as enterprises began shedding workers, government raised the cost of doing 
so by requiring the payment of severance pay. It also gave enterprises an incentive to use 
early retirement, but again enterprises would have to share some of the cost. While enterprise 
social protection benefits have grown so far mainly in relation to the shedding of workers, 
new legislation is aimed at increasing enterprise involvement in supplementary pensions and 
health insurance. The aim apparently is an eventual shift in responsibilities away from 
government and to enterprises. There has already been a shift in costs from government to 
enterprises in the case of sick leave. 
In contrast, enterprise involvement in social services has been diminishing. 
Enterprises have cut back on child care and health clinics. While enterprises have cut their 
services, other sectors such as local governments and an emerging nonprofit sector have had 
an increasing role. Outside of social services, there have been similar enterprise cuts in 
cultural and recreation activities. 
One large and growing area for enterprise benefits has been commodity subsidies such 
as food and clothing. While enterprises decide on these based on their business policy, the 
government has been actively involved through the tax incentives it offers. The rationale for 
considering these as social benefits may not be clear, but the involvement of government 
makes them a part of social policy. 
Our study suggests that the period of transition has brought substantial change to the 
area of enterprise benefits, and has also initiated a realignment of social responsibilities 
between enterprises and other sectors of the economy. However, our results are preliminary 
and need quantitative verification. Our results also suggest guidelines for further 
investigation. Data on benefits should be disaggregated as finely as possible. This is 
necessary because different kinds of benefits move in different directions. It is also essential 
in order to detect the variations across enterprises in benefit policy. Clear standards are 
needed for classifying benefits. The current designation of "social" is applied inconsistently. 
Narrower categories indicating social functions can give interesting insights as we have 
shown. Costs of benefits need to be measured carefully and worker needs or preferences 
somehow identified. Finally, the behavior of government needs to be carefully traced and, to 
the extent that it is endogenous, to be modeled. Future research along these lines should 
improve our understanding about the Hungarian benefit system during the period of transition. 
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